While reading the paper I just blogged about (Mandryk et al., 2006). An experiment idea came to my head, I write it here in order to start refining it.
The thought came from their second experiment when comparing physiological data and subjective scale from participants playing a game alone against a computer or against a friend, in the same room. Results implied higher engagement and fun when playing with a friend than with a computer.
Collaborative settings are supposed to add something. In learning the proximal zone, artefacts and mutual modelling support and define what is collaboration. the outcome is a better learing when collaborating, partly due to side effects of maintaining a shared representation all along the task.
Now, in this experiment, playing against a friend creates much more engagement.
Efficiency of collaborative learning settings can be due to improved engagement in the task, more cognitive ressources would be allowed (I need a reference showing that more engagement leads to better cognitive efficiency, this must not be too hard). So maybe a shared representation and all these things are side effect of improved engagement. On the contrary we could say that the increased engagement is due to these supplementary tasks due to collaboration (or simply the presence of someone else, when playing the game against the other it is not collaborative, nevertheless a model of the other is still needed).
So the question is maybe like who was first between the hen and the egg:
- Collaborative/competitive conditions first necessitate several supplementary processings (sharing a representation in collaborative, create a mutual model in both, etc.). Doing this plus succeeding at the task involves more cognitive processes, but the participant reacts by engaging more in the activity, we observe higher physiological responses.
- Collaborative/competitive conditions engage players intrinsically, various reasons can be invoked such as social comparison, self (other-)esteem, etc. This leads to higher engagement we can call this ego-involvement… So the task becomes more important for the individual and he will develop tools and strategies to achieve it better, such tools can be a shared representation or a mutual model.
I derive something from point 1, related to the Cleap SNF project finishing these days. in fact 1 was partly one of the funding hypothesis of the project. The alternate hypothesis, coming from multimedia learning theories also stated that participants in collaborative learning conditions would need to process several cognitive tasks in order to achieve collaboration (shared representation…). But, relying on cognitive load theories, it predicted poorer understanding since several cognitive ressources necessary to a good comprehension would be used for collaboration and thus unusable (as found by Schnotz, Böckheler & Grzondziel, 1999). But, let’s forget cognitive load for now.
Could we explain Collaborative load and work effects through improved personnal involvement only? Competitive tasks seem more easy to integrate in hypothesis 2 since less “accessory” tasks are needed (mutual modelling is still necessary but a shared representation is less necessary (in fact it is necessary with symbolic games but not in video games, mmh interesting to compare maybe), you don’t need the other to know what you think, you just need to agree on the outcomes of each other’s actions).
Experiment :
What about building an experiment with 2 factors: opponent (computer or human), and knowledge of opponent’s identity (true, false). In order to have self-esteem involved we need to tell the participants that they will meet their opponent afterward, during the debriefing (we can also ask participants to come with a friend and separate them during play, so they know there is someone else, and it is their friend).
Participants would play a competitive game (we also could have another experiment with a collaborative game). They would play 4 rounds, alone in a computer room. Every round the condition would change, twice he would play against another participant once knowing it, once thinking it is a computer, and twice he would play against a computer, once knowing it, once thinking it is a human. Well, let’s make it 8 or 16 rounds in order to have more intra-measures (juste double or quadruple each condition). Balance the order and have another participant in another room playing the same conditions.
Physiological and subjective evaluations would be recorded in order to have informations about engagement, fun and challenge during the tasks.
For the game we can have a quake like (timed rounds), a sports game can be more neutral or a more simple casual game like tetris or another round-based challenge. The kind of game could even be a condition, but in another experiment…
Hypothesis would be that participants thinking that they play against an human opponent will involve themselves in the task more than participants thinking that they play against a computer. The fact that participants really play against an human or a computer will have no effect on the results. We wait no interaction but it is important to prove that only the belief is important.
Ok… well… this experiment is funny but know tell me in what it is related to my bit of theory up there??? damn it, I lost my track or I missed the point… Ok, please do not run this experiment without me!